The legal position against total war hardened after 1945, with a raft of amendments to the Geneva Conventions designed to protect civilians. The 1951 Genocide Convention prohibited attempts to eliminate or erase the identity of whole communities. This meant that embracing a total war model essentially amounted to being ready to commit war crimes, although of course those prepared to commit such crimes either do not recognise the legal framework or else they believe the victims have been disqualified from its protections because of their inherent characteristics or their own, even greater, crimes.

A total war philosophy escalates the risks associated with the conflict, especially in the nuclear age, as well as the humanitarian consequences. As all of Ukraine was involved in resisting aggression and occupation, the Russians could claim that everyone was a potential combatant and none deserved immunity. There is, however, a considerable difference between dealing with civilians when they are acting as combatants and deliberately targeting civil society to coerce the government into capitulation.

After the 8 April 2022 attack on the Kramatorsk train station, which killed and injured hundreds, Russian state media pushed the idea that Ukraine was responsible. This included a fake BBC News story that placed the blame on Ukraine. (...) The Russians initially claimed a successful strike against the station until they realised how many innocent civilians they had killed.

In 2022, as in 2014, Russian media broadcast regular, lurid descriptions of the terrible things Russia would do o any interfering country, neglecting to mention what these countries could do in return. The aim was to present Russia as a country with unlimited power, a will to use it, and little sense of proportion, so that any minor provocation could result in terror raining down on the perpetrator.

The most natural place to start with any peace initiative is a proposal for a ceasefire. Once agreed, it is possible to move on to a proper peace settlement dealing with the underlying dispute. But the risk of a ceasefire is that there is no subsequent progress: matters are left in a state of suspended animation. The ceasefire in the Korean Ware agreed in 1953 is often mentioned in this regard as it has yet to lead to a peace treaty.

The most important lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian ware are about the unwisdom of embarking on major military enterprises on the basis of wishful thinking. On 12 June 2022 I made eight points on the limits of military power:

1. Do not depend on the first military move being decisive. If it is no decisive, you will be fighting a very different war to the one envisaged.
2. A poor performance in the early stages of a war will prolong its length if it does no lead to immediate defeat.
3. It is easier to start wars than end them.
4. Forces are more determined when defending their own territory than when invading someone else's.
5. Resistance does not necessarily conclude with the defeat of defending forces but can lead to insurgency. This is why it is always unwise to occupy countries where you will not be welcome.
6. The longer wars go on, the more important non-military considerations (such as national resilience, economic strength, alliances, and partnerships) become to their resolution.
7. During the course of a war, the political objectives for which it is being fought will change so that the prospective gains can justify the actual costs, thereby making the war harder to conclude.
8. The unintended consequences of wars are normally as important, if not more important, than the intended.

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