(PolyMatter video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTbILK0fxDY&t)

Japan’s labour force, for example, has been declining since the 1990s and will be one-third smaller by 2035. This is compounded by the unbalanced ratios between those who are in the workforce and those who are not, and who are reliant on some sort of support (they range from the young to the old, and include those on benefits or needing care). The dependency ratio in most advanced countries for the mid- and, often, late-twentieth century was approximately 4:1 (four in paid employment to one dependent), and even higher if the ratio was calculated as the number of workers in relation to those aged over 65. By the mid-twenty-first century, many high-income countries will have a ratio of 2:1, and in some, such as Japan, the ratio will be even lower than this.

The nature and roles of the family and family members have changed considerably over time. Through the medieval period, families were primary economic units as much as they were a major form of social and biological reproduction. Children were not children as we now regard them; rather they were workers as soon as they were able, in order to contribute to the economic survival of the family. And there were often a lot of births, both to compensate for high infant mortality and also to provide an adequate familial workforce. Then two important changes altered family functions and how they operated in the Western world: the Industrial Revolution separated home and work, notably in those countries such as the UK where it encouraged the urbanisation of society; and, later in the nineteenth century, compulsory education was introduced and so children were unavailable as workers while they were in school.

In New Zealand, 75 per cent of sole parents are not working (compared to an OECD average of 61 per cent) and are therefore reliant on benefits.

Canada, Australia and New Zealand have particular similarities. These three nations developed as the result of British colonialism (although the French also played an important role in Canada). In all three, the displacement of, and aggression towards, their original inhabitants have been a defining element of early colonialism, followed by various forms of acknowledgement and redress since the late twentieth century. British migrants, values and institutions were influential in establishing the nature of settlement and nationhood (noting, again, the French influence in Canada) in each, and each has seen a move in the second half of the twentieth century to welcome previously excluded migrants from Asia. The result has been that all three societies are now among the most super-diverse of any globally.

In 2019 the Economist noted: If everyone who wanted to migrate [globally] were able to do so, global GDP would double…. No other policy change comes close to generating such colossal rewards. [However] … in most rich countries immigration is political gelignite … migrants are [seen as] disruptive, strain public services, take jobs from locals and are often criminal.

New Zealand has a clear set of ambitions concerning immigration that are generally shared across party lines, as the minister of immigration, Michael Woodhouse, indicated in 2017: The Government uses the immigration system to facilitate a number of specific, and sometimes unrelated, objectives. These include: building the skill level of the workforce, filling skill shortages, encouraging investment, growing export markets, supporting foreign relations, implementing humanitarian commitments and enabling New Zealanders to form and maintain families.

But there is a lag as immigrant workers struggle to gain parity with others who have the same skills and experience. It typically takes immigrants about a decade to catch up with their peers.

The prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, impressed many locally and internationally by adopting a black hijab and personally consoling those affected. But it was her statement of solidarity with Muslims — ‘They are us. The person who has perpetuated this violence against us is not.’ — that marked a defining moment.

In a postscript to these politics of unity and recognition and as an example of the politics of exclusion, in 2019 Hannah Tamaki of the Destiny Church issued a press release stating ‘they are not us’ in reference to what she called ‘parallel cultures, faith and customs’. The critical reception was immediate. The prime minister’s statement and the diametrically opposed response from a conservative Pentecostal fundamentalist Christian politician signal the need to constantly consider what preserves and enhances social cohesion in New Zealand.

The New Zealand Company tended to oversell what was waiting for British settlers, and quite a number opted to return once they experienced the tough reality of colonial New Zealand.

Population projections are that between 2013 and 2043 Auckland is expected to grow by 49 per cent.

In 2015, the World Migration Report cited Auckland as the fourth most diverse city globally in terms of the proportion who were migrants.

One of the characteristics of many immigrants, for example, is that they are able to buy mid-level or high cost housing, and one of the drivers for both newcomers and those already in the Auckland housing market has been to seek stand-alone and relatively large houses. This tension has resulted in what has been called the ‘paradox of density’:

As people grow richer they demand more space. Despite the efforts of many urban planners to stop them, they move from cramped inner cities to sparsely populated fringes … Moreover, because people are living longer and having fewer children, a growing proportion of households contain only one or two people.

One of the initiatives with a significant beneficial impact on older community members is the notion of intergenerational living, the requirement that when a residential home for older people is being built, it must include facilities or services that deliver a mixing of generations. For example, a residential home for older people might also have to build a crèche in order to obtain consent, so that old and young are co-located, at least for part of the day.

Using 2006 as a base year for New Zealand, it is anticipated that the expenditure required for LTC [long-term care, for the elderly] will increase from 1.4 per cent of GDP to around 3.5–4.3 per cent by 2050. New Zealand is one of those countries where the increase in LTC costs will exceed GDP growth by some margin.

This presents a challenge in terms of who pays, and how. In 2006, 90 per cent of LTC was paid for by the New Zealand government. Will that funding remain at this level? An additional challenge is the workforce required. The demand for nurses and personal care workers will more than double through to mid-century. And this growth is out of kilter with the size and growth of the total working population.

Although most boomers will feel that they have accumulated housing wealth by their hard work, from a generational perspective, most of the gains came from the biggest and longest housing boom on record … Boomers, who were the last generation to truly benefit from generational progress and a massive house-price boom, face an uncomfortable choice. One option is to reduce their current wealth by paying more taxes to help younger generations … The other option is to wait. Until their influence has diminished in politics and the next generation makes a grab for their accumulated wealth.

In the New Zealand context, there is evidence that younger voters are not engaged. As public policy academic Richard Shaw has noted, in the 2014 general election, only 75 per cent of those eligible to enrol among 18–24-year-olds chose to do so, and of those, fewer than half actually voted.

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